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CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG THE ZAMBIAN COPPER MINERS 1950-1966 
By Jane Parpart 
This paper seeks to evaluate the degree of class consciousness and class 
action among the black copper miners of Zambia during the 1950s and early 
1960s. These miners were clearly the most organized work force in Zambia 
during this period. Since the establishment of the copper industry in 1924, 
the black miners had gradually evolved collective forms of labor protest. 
During the 1940s, the growing number of more stabilized skilled black 
minersl fought for worker representation, first for themselves, and later 
for the entire work force. After the establishment of the African 
Mineworkers' Union in 1948, these miners successfully campaigned for union 
support among the work force. By the early 1950s, most miners had recognized 
the advantage of organized collective action against management and joined the 
union.2 Since then, the African miners have generally supported the union. 
This indicates that most copper miners during this period had at least a 
"worker consciousness that is, an awareness of their identity of 
opposition to management within the copper industry, and a commitment to 
organized collective action to protect worker interests. 
The question at issue in this paper is the degree to which the miners had, 
or did not have, a broader consciousness, one which included a perception of 
the emerging class structure of Zambia as a whole, and an understanding of the 
need to join with other workers, both in trade unions and political parties, 
in pursuit of class goals. We are not speaking here of revolutionary class 
consciousness, which aims at a fundainental reorganization of society, but 
rather of a commitment to collective action designed to improve the position 
of the working class, or a segment of that class within the existing, or a 
similar, social structure. This paper also seeks to understand the 
interaction between the emerging class consciousness of the miners and 
nationalist politics. 
In this paper, the term class consciousness is not used in the old-
fashioned Marxist sense -- namely, to indicate an awareness of the unity of 
interests of all workers and the need for revolutionary political action to 
pursue these worker interests. In contrast, class consciousness is seen as a 
process which has a number of different stages. These stages are outlined as 
follows: 
1. Workers must be aware of their position in a class hierarchy and 
accept the relative permanence of this status (class identity). 
2. At the level of consumption, workers must recognize that they are 
exploited by management through the wage relationship and are not 
receiving a fair share of the socially produced surplus in the form of 
wages (worker opposition). 
3. Workers must recognize that their collective class interest is 
antagonistic to that of management and must be willing to engage in 
class conflict, e.g., striking, in order to secure their class 
interest (worker consciousness). 
4. Workers must be willing to form organizations to pursue class 
interests, regardless of prior status or social origin of fellow 
workers (trade union consciousness). 
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5. At a societal level, workers must recognize the need to engage in 
political activity in order to create the conditions that will secure 
their class interests (political class consciousness). 
6. Workers recognize the need to join with all other workers in political 
action in order to revolutionize society (revolutionary class 
consciousness) 
Progression through these stages is not linear; it varies with specific 
historical circumstances. 
The behavior of the copper miners during this period has led most scholars 
writing on the Copperbelt to question the degree of working class conscious-
ness among the Zambian miners. Throughout this period, the African 
Mineworkers' Union frequently refused to cooperate both with other workers in 
the Congress of Trade Unions (TUC) and with the African nationalist political 
parties- The union focused on industrial disputes within the copper industry 
instead. The mine townships increasingly turned into labor enclaves, cut off 
from much of the ferment of the period. In an effort to explain this 
behavior, most studies have· accepted Epstein's conclusion that the special 
nature of work and life on the mines created an industrial parochialism which 
obscured a wider consciousness of class and the need for class-based political 
action.4 
In contrast, this study argues that a reexamination of the evidence in the 
light of class analysis indicates considerable class consciousness among the 
black miners during this period, despite limitations placed on class action by 
external circumstances. By distinguishing between attitudes and behavior, a 
very different picture emerges, one in which the miners reveal a well-
developed class consciousness and a commitment to effective class action both 
in trade unions and political parties. 
Cooperation with the White Miners 
Where, then, is the evidence for a more developed consciousness among the 
Zambian copper miners? One factor which has been largely overlooked by 
scholars is the history of periodic cooperation between white and black miners 
on the Copperbelt. In 1940 the black mineworkers struck for higher wages at 
the very mines where the European union had just concluded successful 
strikes. Both the organization and the rhetoric of the black strike leaders 
was closely based on the European strike.5 During the war years, the 
stabilized miners, particularly the boss boys, pressed management for worker 
representation, first for themselves and later for the work force as a whole. 
The European union was an important catalyst in this process. As the labor 
department (established in 1940) reported in 1946, "there can be little doubt 
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that it is due to an awareness that Europeans have formed trade unions for the 
purpose of collective bargaining that , , , the more advanced and intelligent 
Africans , , • feel it is only by this means that they can be given an 
opportunity of improving their wages and working conditions. "6 
In their efforts to establish African worker representation, some of the 
higher grade black miners also began to recognize the identity of interests 
among white and black mineworkers, and the potential power of multi-racial 
labor action, These miners were gloomy about prospects for an African trade 
union in the near future, knowing full well that "anyone who mentioned union 
in the African context before Mr. Comrie came was aiming for to get into 
trouble. "7 The supervisory level African miners associated on a daily basis 
with European miners, and their relations were often quite good,8 Many of 
them agreed with the European union's policy of equal pay for equal work, 
While never willing to accept the European leaders' promises, and always 
somewhat suspicious of European miners' good intentions, some of the higher 
grade miners could see they would be better off fighting management as part of 
a monolithic multi-racial union than fighting alone, They had seen the 
European union win victories without bloodshed. 9 As Labor Officer William 
Stubbs admitted, "the African mistrusted the Europeans but they were no 
fools, They were prepared to learn from anybody who would teach them,"10 
Consequently, when the European union voted in 1946" to allow Africans to 
establish junior branches of their union, many of the more ardent advocates of 
trade unionism among the black miners decided to join the Europeans, In 1946 
branches in Luanshya and Nkana were "ticking away quite nicely," and prospects 
for branches at the other mines looked good,11 
Although government and company officials prevented the establishment of a 
multi-racial union, the two unions joined forces against management at various 
points throughout the next 14 years. Despite resentment over the European 
union's efforts to protect the privileged position of its workers, in 1950 the 
two unions informally agreed to an advancement plan acceptable to both 
parties,1 2 In 1953, the European union brought Ronald Williams, the legal 
advisor to the British National Union of Mineworkers, to the Copperbelt in 
order to help the African union obtain a favorable settlement to a strike. 
Williams came out again in 1955 to foil management and government's plan to 
dismember the union, Williams threatened to publicize the companies' use of 
scab labor to break the strike, and thus to incur the wrath of organized labor 
around the world. After initially considering trying to bluff Williams, 
management relented, and the union reluctantly agreed to reengage strikers at 
their previous rates of pay, and to leave the union intact.13 
In 1958, the European union and the African Mine workers' Union jointly 
rallied opposition to proposed legislation against unofficial strikes. This 
legislation was based on the Honeyman Commission's investigation of a strike 
by the European rock-breakers, and its recommendation that members of a trade 
union with a closed shop should exhaust all negotiation procedures before 
calling a strike, The companies hoped that this legislation would halt the 
spate of strikes which had plagued the industry since 1954. The legislature, 
which was increasingly hostile to both white and black miners due to reduced 
copper revenues as a result of strike actions, eagerly supported the 
companies, Despite differences over advancement, the leaders of both unions 
realized their common interest in stopping these proposals. The two unions 
solicited the British Trade Union Congress, the National Union of Mineworkers, 
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and the Miners' International Federation to intervene at the Colonial Office 
in their behalf .14 Jack Purvis, general -secretary of the European union, 
and Katilungu even flew to London in March to further their joint case. These 
efforts failed to stop the Legislative Coucil from passing the hated Trade 
Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance,15 but they increased the solidarity 
between the unions. 
One can be cynical and interpret the cooperation between the African and 
European unions as mere transient self-interest. Tension between the two 
unions cannot be dismissed. The European union wanted· to protect the 
privileged position of European miners on the Copperbelt, and that goal 
inevitably conflicted with black miner aspirations as long as job categories 
were defined by color. If the European miners on the Copperbelt had been able 
to protect themselves from management's advancement plans, the European union 
probably would have followed the pattern of European workers in the rest of 
southern Africa. The growing vulnerability of white labor on the Copperbelt 
undoubtedly pushed the two unions together. But, after all, common exploi-
tation has been one of the pivotal factors in the development of workers' 
identity and solidarity all over the world. The congruence of occupational 
and racial divisons facilitated division within the mine work force. 
Certainly suspicion between the two groups, and outright racialism, 
continued. However, the leaders of the two unions, and many members, clearly 
understood the common interests binding black and white mine workers, and the 
potential power of multi-racial worker action against management. Thus, 
within the copper industry many workers recognized that class divisions 
transcended racial divisions, and that class action did not have to follow 
racial lines. 
Political consciousness on the mines before Federation 
Even acknowledging the existence of a worker consciousness which 
transcended racial divisions within the copper industry, can we legitimately 
claim that the African miners understood the emerging class structure of 
Northern Rhodesia, particularly their identity with other workers and the link 
between management and the state? And further, were they willing to engage in 
political activity at a societal level in order to create conditions which 
would secure their class interests? 
For an answer to these questions we must look at the role the African 
copper miners and the union played in early nationalist politics. The 
evidence indicates that the miners formed the backbone of the Copperbelt wing 
of the African National Congress (ANC) the African political party 
established in 1951 to fight against the proposed Federation of Southern 
Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland.16 A number of union leaders 
held office in Congress as well. For example, in 1952, when Congress set up·a 
Supreme Action Council to plan, and, if necessary, to order, a total 
withdrawal of labor in order to cripple the colonial government, both 
President Lawrence Katilungu and Secretary Simon Kaluwa of the African 
Mineworkers' Union held seats on this council and endorsed its aims.17 
Some of the leaders of the African Mineworkers' Union organized closer 
cooperation between workers and Congress through the Trade Union Congress. 
Formed in 1951 under William Comrie's guidance, the Congress had fallen into 
disuse under Katilungu's leadership. Capitalizing on this neglect, the 
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Puta/Chapoloko faction of the Mineworkers' Union turned the TUC into a forum 
for anti-Federation propaganda. Both Robinson Puta and Jameson Chapolokol9 
opposed the separation of political and industrial issues. They called for 
African worker unity against the colonial state, claiming that only national 
liberation would bring a better life for African workers. The TUC maintained 
a political subcommittee which included a number of prominent branch leaders 
from the African Mineworkers' Union. This committee formulated plans for 
supporting political action by labor, insisting that the cause of the 
mineworkers' union and the nationalist movement were one.20 
Table .-1 Executive Officers and Political Action Subcommittees, 1952 
Executive Officers, Trade Union Congress, August 1952 
Office 
President 
Vice-President 
General Secretary 
Executive Member 
Executive Member 
Name 
Dixon Konkola 
Robinson Puta 
Matthew Nkoloma 
Jameson Chapoloko 
Justin Chimba 
Union 
Railway Workers 
Mineworkers' Union 
Mineworkers' Union 
Mineworkers' Union 
Unknown 
=============================================================================== 
Chairman 
Secretary 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Political Action Subcommittee, 1952 
Dixon Konkola 
Matthew Nkoloma 
Paul Kalichini 
Jonathan Mubanga 
Chanda 
Matthew Mwendapole 
Jameson Kamitengo 
Jameson Chapoloko 
Gordon Chindele 
Railway Workers 
Mineworkers' Union 
Industrial Workers 
Municipal Workers 
Railway Workers 
Mineworkers' Union 
Mineworkers' Union 
Mineworkers' Union 
Mineworkers' Union 
----------------------
Source: Bates, Unions, 127, 
Despite the structural and ideological· congruence between the African 
Mineworkers' Union and Congress, the union leaders disagreed about the degree 
of political involvement appropriate to the union, More militant union 
leaders wanted close cooperation between the union and Congress, while 
Katilungu worried about the consequences of such action, Katilungu stopped 
the Supreme Action Council's call for a political strike in February 1952 
because it would interfere with an industrial dispute on the mines. He 
refused to cooperate with Puta and Chapoloko in their decision to call a 
strike at Nkana protesting the deportation of Simon Zukas, a European involved 
in the ANC and an active supporter of worker involvement in politics, When 
management dismissed Chapoloko and others involved in the strike, Katilungu 
did not protest. Later in March 1953, Katilungu withdrew the union's support 
for two days of national prayer organized by Congress to protest Britain's 
support for Federation. Katilungu claimed participation in the strike would 
bring massive dismissals, and therefore threatened the position of the union, 
Since he believed the union's job was to fight for a better position for 
African miners, he refused to countenance political actions which might 
endanger worker interests.21 
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As we have seen, the union's refusal to cooperate whole-heartedly with 
Congress' efforts to stop Federation has led scholars to question the 
existence of either a populist or a class based political consciousness among 
the miners at this time. However, a closer look at the evidence suggests a 
different interpretation. Most importantly, Katilungu's behavior as president 
of the union takes on a different character when placed in the historical 
context of the political-economy of Northern Rhodesia. The capacity of 
management and the state to limit union actions was still very great, despite 
conciliatory efforts surronding the Federation campaign. Government officials 
might refuse to interfere in industrial disputes, but they had no qualms about 
stopping an alliance between the union and Congress. Labor officers and 
company officials might refuse to interfere in industrial disputes, but they 
had no qualms about stopping an alliance between the union and Congress. 
Labor officers and company officials insisted that the union must remain 
outside politics, threatening dire consequences to worker advancement if this 
advice was not followed. Comrie made this one of his basic trade union 
prin~iples. Katilungu's involvement in the ANC, and his participation in the 
planning of Congress's two days of national prayer indicate considerable 
commitment on his part to political action by the union. According to an 
informant, his last minute withdrawal from the two-day protest only occurred 
after management informed him that protesters would be dismissed. The 
companies had already fired workers at Nkana for a political strike over the 
Zukas affair. Consequently, Katilungu realized this was not an idle 
threat.22 When faced with a choice between massive disruption on the mines 
and possible loss of employment for miners in an economy which offered only 
limited alternative economic opportunities of equal value, Katilungu's 
behavior is understandable, not as proof of lack of political consciousness, 
but as the actions of a man with limited options. In this light, Katilungu's 
decision to keep the union outside politics emerges as a pragmatic solution in 
an oppressive colonial context, rather than proof of the absence of political 
consciousness either on his part or on the part of the miners as a whole. 
The evidence from oral interviews and other sources reveals considerable 
commitment to the nationalist cause among individual miners. Informants 
recalled widespread support for Congress among the miners during this 
period.23 As we have seen, many of the trade union leaders were active in 
both ANC and the Trade Union Congress. One informant, who was both chairman 
of the trade union and Congress at Chibuluma, even reported that "the trade 
union in 1951 was more a political party than a trade union. That is why the 
government did not like it ... z4 Leading trade unionists used methods 
pioneered by the union to build up the party. The union had "made people like 
the importance of meetings. We called big meetings. This was before the 
Congress came into being. People got used to meetings so when these things 
about the government were talked over, they went too. "25 As one informant 
stated, the trade union "was the mother of the political parties. She had 
only to guide it as children. "26 
Most miners supported the nationalist movement for the same reasons other 
Africans did, namely the belief that popular self-rule would bring a better 
life for all Africans in Northern Rhodesia. Like most Africans in Northern 
Rhodesia, the miners worried that Southern Rhodesia would be the dominant 
power in the Federation. Knowing Southern Rhodesia well, they had no desire 
to see its institutions adopted in their own country, particularly Southern 
Rhodesian labor legislation. 27 Thus, most miners who supported ANC simply 
wanted a better deal for Africans, although they undoubtedly expected a black 
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government to favor their interests against those of white dominated capital. 
Consciousness of the need for worker political action to pursue class 
interests was probably limited by the still ambiguous connection between 
management and the state. Since the establishment of the African Mineworkers' 
Union in 1948, the government, or at least the labor department, had appeared 
to be impartial, if not openly favorable, to the cause of the miners. In 
1953, for example, a government tribunal (the Guillebaud Tribunal) settled a 
strike in favor of the miners, largely to mollify African discontent over the 
Federation issue. While outright coercion by government officils, such as the 
governor's reprimand to the Roan union leader, Alfred Mwalwanda, 28 
emphasized the special relationship between government and the companies, and 
informants recalled growing suspicions of government among the miners as they 
saw how little the labor officers were able to do to force more generous 
concessions from management,29 the alliance between government and 
management was still far from clear. 
Even those miners who agreed with Simon Zukas that "a trade union must act 
politically in defense of its members, "30 did not recognize the potential 
contradictions between the economic goals of the African union and those of 
the nationalist movement. Congress promised to improve the relative posit on 
of Africans and white men, and to stop the color bar, both fundamental tenets 
of the union.31 The militants had no more revolutionary vision of society 
in mind at this point. 32 As a result, they advocated using the union's 
organizational powers in support of political causes in the belief that the 
African miners would gain from African political advancement. Thus, while the 
militants recognized the need for workers to organized politically, they did 
not yet differentiate between nationalist and class based political action. 
Consciousness and the class struggle 
After the successful establishment of Federation in 1953, the copper 
companies no longer had to conciliate either their black workers or the 
British government. As a result, in 1954 they launched a long cherished 
scheme to reduce labor costs by advancing some experienced black miners. 
Management expected this strategy to reduce labor costs while creating an 
African middle class loyal to the status quo. The companies also planned to 
divide the black work force by establishing a separate worker association for 
these advancees. This would remove the most articulate miners from the union, 
and, from management's point of view, would hopefully have "the effect of 
balancing the extremists in the present union."33 
While refusing to openly support attacks on white miners privileges, the 
Federal government needed copper revenues too desperately to oppose corporate 
policies against white miners. The Federal government was, however, more than 
willing to reduce the power of the African Mineworkers' Union. 
The companies hoped they could implement this new strategy without a 
violent confrontation with their black labor force. Management counted on a 
lack of commitment to the African union, as well as a willingness to 
compromise for material gains. They also hoped to persuade the more moderate 
union leaders, notably Katikungu, to accept the legitimacy of a separate staff 
association. However, the companies were quite ready to use stronger methods 
to enforce change as well. 
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As events turned out, more forceful methods were necessary. For the next 
3 years the union fought to maintain its control over all black mineworkers. 
During this period, worker commitment to the union grew steadily, as did 
willingness to use political action to protect worker interests. 
The union leaders reacted strongly to the threatened secession of the 
supervisory level miners. Meetings were called in which friends and families 
were asked to convince association members to return to the fold. Union 
leaders repeatedly called for unity, accusing the breakaways of trying to 
destroy the union. Staff association members were compared to makopa, or dead 
fish, a name which soon spread , throughout the Copperbelt. Those who refused 
to join the union were denigrated as "fools because even they will also be 
discharged one day. They are blind because they cannot realize that the Union 
is here to safeguard the freedom of future generations." Anyone not entirely 
with the union was declared an enemy.34 
In the ensueing struggle between the African Minerworkers' Union and 
management, most of the miners rallied to support the union. Songs ridiculing 
staff members spread throughout the township. Wherever MASA members and their 
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families went, hostile compound inhabitants followed, jeering and singing 
insulting songs. One informant recalled getting stoned occasionally, and 
seeing children shouting insults at the children of staff members.35 
Feelings ran so high that when three union men were sent to jail for 
intimidating staff miners, 400-500 miners went to the Boma and insisted that 
they wanted to go to jail also. A riot squad had to disperse them. As one 
informant recalled, "hostility reached a point where it was only a very bold 
man who could go up and greet a man on monthly contract. "36 
Indeed, many potential staff members refused to accept staff status 
because of their loyalty to the union, and their recognition of the need for 
worker solidarity in opposition to management. A few staff members returned 
to the union because of social pressures. By May 1954, only 279 miners out of 
a potential membership of 4160 belonged to MASA, and by March 1955, only 469 
out of 3535 eligible miners had joined the association.37 
This crisis caused a change in union leadership as well. Less skilled 
miners began to fear that union leaders in line for advancement would refuse 
to risk industrial conflict for their own job security. Some miners dropped 
out of the union.38 However, most reacted by voting for more militant union 
leaders in the 1954 branch elections. Many of the union leaders in line for 
advancement lost their offices in the election. Men like Robinson Puta at 
Nchanga and Sylvester Nkoma at Roan won the election -- both men with records 
of political activism and involvement in the TUc.39 
This victory suggests that the struggle against management was 
politicizing some of the black miners. Epstein discovered that the new branch 
leaders were partially elected for their reputation as ruthless 
negotiators.40 However, they were known to favor political action by the 
union as well. It seems reasonable to assume that their victories expressed 
some support for this philosophy. This hypothesis is further strengthened by 
Katilungu' s support for a 10s8d per shift across-the-board wage increase. 
While this demand was primarily designed to strengthen the appeal of the 
union, it had a political aspect as well since the 10s8d increase would 
qualify many African miners for the vote under current Northern Rhodesian 
franchise. laws.41 The architects of the increase, Puta and Chapoloko, 
realized that this was a political as well as an industrial statement. The 
fact that Katilungu agreed to this demand, knowing full well it would be 
unacceptable to the companies, reveals a growing unity of purpose among the 
union leaders. Katilungu even agreed with the militants that a long strike 
might be necessary for the defense of the union.42 
During the next two years, miner support for the militant leaders of the 
union grew steadily. When the companies rejected union demands, the workers 
almost unanimously voted for a strike action. In January 1955, all but ·4,115 
of the 34,000 African miners stopped work, 43 and a bitter two-month long 
strike began. In late January, management threatened to dismiss all 
strikers. The companies hired 2,000 "scab workers" in an attempt to break the 
strike. They also tried to intimidate workers through loudspeakers operating 
from vans in the townships. These efforts failed. Many of the "scabs" joined 
the strike.44 The unity and determination of the work force held fast. 
By February, both government and company officials were thoroughly 
exasperated with the union. The companies wanted to dismantle the union, and 
suggested a return to wage councils or some other form of worker 
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representation. As far as management was concerned, "trade unionism for 
Africans has been tried, and has failed. It was artificially created and is 
rotten to the core... The leaders are at best, lacking in intelligence and 
experience, and the mass of the workers is but little removed from primitive 
savagery. "45 While not endorsing quite such a negative view, the labor 
department and other government officials agreed with the companies that "the 
power of the Union must be broken, new leaders found and a new means of 
negotiating with the Africans set up. "46 
Only the timely intervention of Ronald Williams, mentioned above, saved 
the union. However, this settlement did not alter management's hostility to 
the union, nor its determination to strengthen the staff association. The 
companies made no effort to compromise with the union. They denied the union 
a right to discuss dimissals even in cases of alleged victimization. African 
Township Committees were set up to undercut union authority in the mine 
townships.47 Management inaugurated a labor rationalization scheme which 
impeded the absorption of men in the labor pool. As a result, a number of 
union activists remained in the pool doing manual labor for extended 
periods.48 Some workers were not reinstated. In June of 1955, the 
companies offered all supervisory and staff category miners options to 
transfer over to monthly pay at an increase of 14 percent per year. And that 
fall, the companies announced that MASA members held 62 of the 75 new advanced 
jobs, with another two for the Mines African Police Association.49 
In response to these threats, the union renewed its campaign against 
MASA. It cancelled the October 1955 agreement to recognize the association. 
At meetings throughout the Copperbelt, the union leaders stepped up their 
attack on staff miners. They accused the staff association of being "the 
child of the mining companies." Union leaders reiterated their warnings that 
the companies were trying to destroy the union, and called for workers to join 
forces in defense of the union.50 
Once again, the miners supported the union. Most higher grade miners 
continued to reject the staff association. Indeed, one informant claimed that 
the staff association was not really functioning at this time and that many of 
the miners who joined refused to participate because of loyalty to the 
union.51 Thus, rather than destroying the union, the struggle to protect 
the union appeared to be strengthening the collective identity and commitment 
to trade un101sm among the black miners. Exept for a small number of 
advancees, the black miners stood firmly on the side of the union. 
The struggle to save the union increased political consciousness among the 
miners as well. As Chisata recalled, "People (the miners) began to realize 
that no matter how much we fight for our rights we cannot succeed entirely if 
we don't change the government set up."52 Until the 1954 strike, government 
officials had appeared reasonably impartial in industrial disputes. Indeed, 
in the early years union leaders had looked to government labor officers for 
aid and assistance against the companies. The 1954 strike destroyed that 
illusion. The police protection for companies vans as they toured the 
compounds spreading propaganda during the strike, government support for the 
staff association, as well as the realization that only Ronald Williams' s 
intervention prevented a government attempt to weaken the union, all served to 
clarify the alliance between the state and the companies. Indignities 
suffered by miners in the labor pools after the strike further exacerbated 
feelings of resentment among the miners against both company and government 
11 
officials. More and more miners began to understand that industrial action 
was not enough, that they needed to engage in political activity in order to 
create conditions that would secure their class interests. One informant 
recalled that "some miners even began to feel more anti-government than 
anti-mine, believing the biggest enemy was the government.53" 
In 1955, militant union leaders further consolidated their hold on the 
Trade Union Congress. Dixon Konkola, President of the Northern Rhodesian 
Railway African Worker's Trade Union and an active African National Congress 
organizer in 1952-1953, wrested the presidency of the Trade Union Congress 
away from Katilungu. He created a sub-committee of nine, headed by himself 
and Nkoloma, to deal with political matters. These leaders maintained 
connections with the World Federation of Trade Unions (W.F.T.U.). They 
publicly announced their support for a united effort by Congress and all 
African trade unions to gain economic and political advancement for Africans 
in Northern Rhodesia. Konkola openly condemned the staff association, and 
called for political and industrial action against the association.54 
Congress became increasingly involved in the union's fight against MASA. 
The leadership of both organizations continued to overlap. By 1956, 20 out of 
a total of 59 branch officials of the African union were officers in Congress 
and 32 were full members. African National Congress leaders occasionally made 
political speeches at union meetings. Union leaders did the same at Congress 
meetings. 55 Congress saw the staff association as part of the hated Federal 
plan for an African middle class. Consequently, attacking the staff 
association fit in with the general nationalist rhetoric. At this point, the 
economic objectives of the union and the goals of ANC coincided. 
Consequently, union and party leaders could readily join forces in their 
condemnation of Federation. Katilungu even began speaking of Nkumbula as 
Northern Rhodesia's national leaders.56 On 11 June 1956 Katilungu attended 
an African National Congress meeting in Lusaka where Nkumbula accused the 
companies of trying to break the union. And on June 23, African National 
Congress and the African Mineworkers' Union held a public meeting to discuss 
trade union issues, and Congress publicly supported the union's stance on both 
the leg guard issue and the staff association.57 
The rolling strikes and the state of emergency 
The growing tension between the union and the companies came to a head in 
the summer of 1956 when the Chamber of Mines announced in June that all 
employees eligible for the staff association must go on monthly pay and leave 
the union by July 1, or face demotion or discharge.58 The union reacted 
swiftly, organizing a series of strikes culmination in the infamous "rolling 
strikes". These strikes began on July 30. Each mine shut down for three 
days, first at a big mine, then followed by a small mine, and so forth. The 
series began at Roan on August 2, followed by Broken Hill on August 9. 
Throughout this period, the union continued to demand the termination of the 
1955 agreement and the dissolution of MASA.59 
The strikes were well organized and solidly supported by the work force. 
Strikers stopped going to the welfare centers to express their hostility to 
staff miners. Small groups of friends pooled their savings to help one 
another, garden produce was bartered to obtain necessities, and union leaders 
drew up plans to feed everyone if rations were withdrawn.60 
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As with the 1954 strike, the rolling strikes were clearly organized by the 
African union to win an industrial dispute. That fact, the Branigan 
Commission's rejection of Congress's control over the union, and later 
apolitical behavior of the miners have led scholars to play down the political 
aspect of the rolling strikes.61 This study contends, however, that the 
issue is not the degree of control over the union by Congress, but the degree 
to which the miners had come to accept the use of political action to pursue 
their class interests. The evidence indicates a growing willingness by the 
union to use political action in the struggle against management. As we have 
seen, the nationalist leaders publicly supported the strike effort. Congress 
and union leaders maintained close contact throughout the strike. The union 
framed accusations against the staff association in national as well as 
industrial terms, calling for an end to MASA and the Federation.62 
Company and government officials interpreted the strikes as a political 
attack on Federation as well as an industrial dispute. They believed "the 
rolling strikes were the first stirrings against the Federal solution of a 
black middle class... and a rejection of the class of blacks who wanted 
Federation. "63 Corporate and government attitudes towards the strikes 
reflected this view. 
After repeatedly failing to stop the strike by negotiation, the companies 
turned to the Northern Rhodesian government for assistance. By August, both 
company and government officials were ready to purge the union of its 
militant leaders, on the assumption that these men were responsible for the 
union's behavior, particularly its political connections. On September 10 
1956, a state of emergency was declared. Ignoring opportunities for 
compromise, officials arrested 32 union leaders, declared martial law, and 
sent large numbers of Northern Rhodesian police into the townships. Within a 
few more days, police arrested 55 miners, 45 of whom were union 
officials• 64 Arrested leaders were "rusticated" with their families to the 
rural areas, not to be allowed to enter the Copperbelt, let alone return to 
their jobs. 65 The companies and the government hoped this would bring the 
union under control. 
A commission under the chairmanship of Patrick Branigan was set up to 
investigate the strike. Unlike the Guillebaud Tribunal, this commission did 
not worry about conciliating African opinion over Federation. The commission 
ignored African National Congress testimony that "negotiations have failed 
mostly due to the uncompromising attitude of the employer and the I 
am-not-concerned reaction of the Government." Although the commission 
rejected the companies'claim that African National Congress was directly 
involved in the strike, and chastized the companies for misjudging African 
feelings about MASA, it still agreed with the companies that certain changes 
were needed in union structure and negotiating procedures in order to minimize 
future disturbances.66 
Buttressed by these recommendations, government officials moved to change 
the structure of the union. The companies and Deputy Labor Commissioner 
Philpott wanted to dismantle the union and return to earlier forms of worker 
representation. 6 7 Meanwhile, Katilungu, who had been out of the country 
during most of August and early September, returned to Northern Rhodesia to 
try to save the union. With threats of total dismantlment in the air, 
Katilungu had no choice but to cooperate with government and company demands. 
He agreed, and the union was left standing. There were fewer full-time paid 
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officials and supreme council members. Katilungu became both President and 
General-Secretary. He agreed to put the wage demand to arbitration, not to 
ask for weekly pay or for collection of union dues through the payroll, and to 
have branch offices manned primarily by volunteers. Katilungu even advised 
branch committees to cooperate with township advisory committees, agreed to 
abandon the request for shop stewards, and directed members "to stop calling 
monthly paid employees such names as 'informers' or 'makobo'." He advised 
miners that "the union has no enmity against the staff association." He also 
agreed to pause on wage claims, and to turn his attention to improving the 
general work and living conditions of the work force, at the same time 
assuring the companies that "the union would also campaign among its own 
members to improve their manner of living and to keep their houses and gardens 
clean and in good order.68 
The union also promised to stay out of politics. In 1957, some of the 
younger more politicized union lead.ers tried to maintain both political and 
. ff· 69 but management and the labor department opposed this. In 
rirs§n die 1c"o'fil'p'anies offered to collect union subscriptions in return for a 
promise that the union would use neither its funds nor its organizational 
structure for political purposes. In an effort to strengthen the union, 
Katilungu agreed. As a result, union leaders could no longer hold political 
office. Katilungu resigned from the Constitution Party, and the one Congress 
official elected to a union post promptly resigned his political 
position.70 In 1959, the companies imposed even 
against political activism in the mine townships.71 
The creation of a labor enclave 
more stringent conditons 
Thus, after the rolling strikes, the black mineworkers appear to have 
accepted the futility of both violent trade union and political action against 
management. They turned inward and concentrated on maintaining and enjoying 
their privileged economic status. As we have seen, most studies of the copper 
miners in this period have accepted this behavior at face value, taking it as 
proof of an absence of both trade union and political consciousness. This 
study suggests a different interpretation. 
In the first place, the behavior of the miners and the union must be 
examined in the context of both the industrial environment and the larger 
political economy of the period. After the rolling strikes, the union was 
like a "weak kitten."72 Katilungu had promised the miners that "when 
production comes back to normal and general life is decently maintained, then 
we are going to find new ways to approach on all problems and grievances as a 
whole. "73 However, little came of these promises. The union could neither 
stop company dismissals, no:r could it even secure a small wage increase to 
restore confidence in union leadership. Membership dropped precipitously for 
awhile. After the state of emergency, many workers refused leadership 
positions in the union. 74 This situation put the union in a very poor 
barganing position, one which allowed the companies to negotiate at an 
advantage. 
Furthermore, the events of 1955 and 1956 had destroyed any illusions 
miners might have had about obtaining government support against management. 
The lesson was clear -- management could and would ally with the state in 
order to maintain industrial peace on their terms. The labor department's 
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acceptance of continueing dismissals of strike activists on the mines only 
served to emphasize this fact. The government had come down clearly on the 
side of the companies, and the miners knew it. Clearly, overt conflict with 
the companies was a quick way to lose one's job, a fact which dampened 
whatever enthusiasm for labor protest existed after the rolling strikes.75 
The nature of the mine compounds also increased vulnerability to 
managerial discipline. The very factors which facilitated the development of 
worker solidarity and collective action also permitted management to discover 
and get rid of "trouble-makers" in the compounds. The visibility of the 
workers, and the presence of all black miners within the compounds, enabled 
management to keep a close watch over its work force. Compound officials and 
their aids, the mine police, circulated through the compounds at all hours• 
Company spies reported on all meetings and other possible "irregularities" in 
the compounds. 76 As a result, in this period of rising political tensions 
and increased support for management from the Federal government, the 
visibility of the miners facilitated industrial discipline in the compounds. 
Direct confrontation with management became correspondingly more difficult. 
This was no where more evident than in the political spere. The companies 
discouraged political meetings in the mine compounds. Rhokana even banned the 
Congress district secretary from the mine township. District level ANC 
meetings and Congressional youth leagues were forbidden. People who 
transgressed this edict were fired. For example, Nkana' s (Rhokana) leading 
Congress supporter, Chiyendi, was discharged in February 1958 for seditious 
statements about the Queen and propaganda against the missionaries. A number 
of Congress leaders at Rhokana were deliberately allowed to become 
redundant. 77 Miners had to get permits for political meetings, and when 
meetings were held, people spoke guardedly, wary of the inevitable informers 
in the audience. As one informant recalled, with careless words, "you could 
find yourself in an awkward position, you could land yourself in trouble." 
Caution became necessary for suviva1.78 
At the same time, rewards for cooperation increased. The companies 
offered to help build up union membership if the union relinquished any role 
in the nationalist political parties. They also offered workers the best 
living conditions in the Federation. Compound welfare programs were expanded 
during the Federal period. In response to the growing stabilization of the 
black work force, welfare and recreational services tried to contribute to 
Africans' "induction into urban life." Case work expanded in the compounds. 
Case workers counseled miners and their dependents with their personal 
problems. Classes for women and children continued to stress skills which 
helped adjustment to urban life. Self-improvement programs expanded as well, 
particularly the libraries and reading rooms. 79 Special schools prepared 
sons of mine employees for future employment on the mines. They served the 
double purpose of occupying youth in the mine townships and indoctrinating 
future recruits into the values and behavior patterns of industrial labor. 
These schools attracted miners, who welcomed the opportunity to guarantee 
their childrens' future employment.SO Carefully orchestrated propaganda 
repeatedly reminded the mineworkers and their families how lucky they were to 
have such a high standard of living, and warned that this prosperity depended 
upon cooperation and productivity by the miners.Bl 
The companies also tried to 
communities, rather than national 
divert worker 
politics or 
energies into the 
union activities. 
mine 
Area 
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committees were set up in the mine townships to "harness the political social 
aspirations of the African community to community development projects." They 
were designed "to give people a greater interest and pride in the running of 
Township affairs as well as fostering the idea of voluntary welfare work in 
the community.82 The reorganization and expansion of welfare services on 
the mines begun in 1953 continued to provide more activities for the compound 
inhabitants in an effort to divert them from less controversial 
organizations.83 Activities which developed an interest in political 
matters were discontinued. Leadership training in clubs and other group 
activities encouraged moderate thinking, in an effort to discourage political 
extremism. The clubs aimed to "develop and train leaders ••• (to) be moderate 
in outlook, i.e., see the other man's point of view."84 
To further reinforce loyalty, as well as isolate the miners from 
undesirable political influences, the companies deliberately limited mine 
compound facilities to legal residents and their registered guests. The mines 
feared improved compound conditions would attract "hangers on", lowering the 
standard of living of the mine workers, and possible bringing in subversive 
political ideas. They appealed to the government to regulate the flow of 
Africans into the Copperbelt. Government officials sympathized with the 
companies on this matter, being just as concerned as the companies to separate 
the black miners from nationalist political influences. Although unable to do 
much, the government agreed to step up prosecutions of loafers. As a result, 
prosecutions rose dramatically after 1953. Regular raids by mine police, as 
well as an elaborate registration system at each mine discouraged illegal 
visitors.85 These efforts not only isolated the miners from other Africans, 
they also emphasizing the special privileges of being a mine employee. 
Special privileges for staff miners and mine police reinforced divisions 
within the work force. Living in staff housing sections became a badge of 
supervisory status. Elite clubs sheltered staff members from the mockery of 
union miners. Special classes for wives of advancing Africans taught these 
women more "middle class" living habits,86 again reinforcing divisions in 
the work force. All these programs isolated supervisory miners, reinforced 
their dependence upon management, and therefore their need to cooperate with 
management. 
These changes took place in a period of increasing rationalization of the 
mine work force, and of unemployment in the economy at large. The mines found 
it difficult to maintain profits with the fall in copper prices in 1957. The 
high cost of both black and white labor on the mines forced management to 
further rationalize production. Wherever possible, mechanization replaced 
manpower. From February 1957 to September ·1958, Nkana' s labor force was 
reduced by 25 percent, Roan's by 16.5 percent, Mufulira's by 20 percent, and 
Nchanga' s by 11 percent. Turnover on the mines decreased correspondingly, 
falling to 20 percent in 1958. Competition for employment on the mines grew. 
The practice of hiring employees' children only aggravated matters. By 1960, 
Nchanga reported over 1000 job applicants per week for only 20-30 positions. 
Similar figures were reported at the other mines.87 These conditions 
reinforced corporate propaganda about the lucky mine employee. Once again 
market factors favored the employers. 
It was 
increasing 
discipline, 
in this environment of decreasing economic opportunities, 
dependence upon wage labor, and more stringent corporate 
that the behavior of the black miners must be examined. By the 
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late 1950s, most miners were fully proletarianized, depending on wages and 
pensions for their long-term security. Many had lost, or severly loosened, 
the ties with their rural homelands. Consequently, the loss of employment 
threatened these workers severely. Underground miners could not find 
comparable work outside the mines, making them even more vulnerable to the 
threat of dismissal. As in the Depression years, the miners responded to job 
insecurity by increasing their cooperation with the employers, only this time 
the companies offered the miners the opportunity to become permanent 
industrial workers. The mining companies were willing to pay for a smaller 
more skilled and stable work force, and that is what they achieved.BB 
Absenteeism, always a good indicator of employee commitment, continued to fall 
throughout the 1950's, reaching levels below those of British coal workers and 
the U .K. as a whole. For most miners, the rewards for cooperation simply 
outweighed the possible gains of violent labor action at this time. The 
rewards of mine employment were tangible. In a constricting wage labor 
market, these rewards overrode larger considerations for most workers. Harry 
Franklin sensed this when investigating African absenteeism in 1960. He 
concluded that the widening gap in living standards of mine employees and 
other Africans, and the difficulties securing mine employment, made the mine 
workers "value their job very considerably.B9" 
This refusal to jeopardize employment security limited the behavior of 
both staff and union mine workers, forcing a conservative isolationism and 
economistic strategy on the work force. The mines were too powerful, and the 
rewards for cooperation too great, to allow any other course of action. 
Consequently, both union and staff members accepted small but steady 
improvements negotiated within the industrial structure, rather than the 
dramatic protests of the past. The mine work force became increasingly 
absorbed in maintaining the "good life" in the mine townships. The union was 
expected to protect miner living standards. Political activity in the mine 
compound lessened. Local events such as films, football games, and other 
sports and dances drew large crowds. Men and women jammed the beer halls, 
consuming large quantities of beer. Elite miners socialized together in their 
clubs. Both staff and daily paid miners concentrated on maximizing the 
material advantages of mine employment. Some leading miners even asked 
government and the mines to "take action against loafers in the mine townships. 
Class Consciousness in a Labor Enclave 
The question arises whether this economistic behavior reflected a change 
in class consciousness among the black miners as well. Certainly in the case 
of the supervisory miners, management did everything it could to encourage a 
feeling of being "separate and superior from the rest of the workers." Some 
of these miners did align themselves with the Federation, even joining the 
multi-racial United Federal Party and running for political office. This 
behavior alienated the rest of the miners, bringing all supervisory workers 
into question as "informers." Sandford chiwila recalled "alot of strong 
feeling about this." He claimed that "some of the elite were still concerned 
about the average worker, but found it difficult being accepted by the 
workers. "90 This hostility isolated the staff miners, increasing their 
dependence upon managerial favor,91 and their need to cooperate with 
management. Thus, a cyclical situation was created which pushed staff miners 
to behave as a "labor aristocracy." 
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However, the evidence indicates that for most miners the class 
consciousness developed before 1957 remained intact. Clearly most miners 
rejected the staff association's alliance with management. After an initial 
setback in 1957, union membership revived. By 1958, about 15,000 miners 
belonged to the union, and by 1963 membership had risen to over 30,000.92 
Kambafwile, who helped revive the Mufulira branch after 1957, reported that 
the willingness to limit worker demands did not diminish worker solidarity and 
commitment to collective labor action.93 
The union also continued to transcend racial and occupational divisions in 
the mine work force in its pursuit of worker interests during this period. 
The African and European unions combined against the Honeyman proposals. In 
1961 the European union supported the African demand for a unitary 
wagescale.94 The staff and daily paid black miners even joined together to 
fight for the proposed wage scale. Both groups resented the gap between 
European and African wages, and in 1961 they formed a Liason Committee to 
pressure the companies. Only strong opposition from management, and a 10 per 
cent salary increase convinced MASA to settle separately with the companies. 
In the subsequent strike, the union demanded MASA's abolition, not because of 
feelings of irrevocable differences, but because staff members could not be 
relied on as allies in industrial disputes due to their vulnerable position 
vis-a-vis management. The union wanted advancement for all rather than the 
few, a unitary wage scale, and reincorporation of the advancees into the 
union.95 These demands revealed a continuing desire to unify the work 
force, and a perception of the common interests of staff and daily paid miners 
despite hostility generated between them by corporate policies. 
Within the constraints set by management, most miners and their dependents 
also continued to support the nationalist political parties. In 1958 miners 
flocked to the more radical Zambian African National Congress (ZANC), and 
later, to its successor, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) 96 
As the tempo of political conflict increased, so did political activity in the 
mine townships. Mine inhabitants obtained permission to hold political 
meetings. The meetings drew large crowds, despite competition from corporate 
welfare activities.97 The ever present company spies forced participants to 
watch their language, and the threat of dismissal limited political action in 
the tonwships.98 However, outright rebellion surfaced occasionally. For 
example, one informant reported sneaking an African nationalist leader into 
the opening ceremony of a mine welfare hall, where he stood up and shouted 
ZANC, much to the consternation of government and mine officials. 99 In the 
turbulent years before independence, competition between ANC and UNIP created 
havoc in the townships. Women and youths joined political brigades which 
pressured people to join their party. The high correlation between ANC and 
the staff miners only aggravated matters. In 1963, for example, seven 
employees and fifteen other people died in the mine townships of Nchanga and 
Bancroft,100 and at Mufulira, a club manager only escaped serious injury 
from an ANC youth group by locking himself in the pantry until rescued.101 
Unrest reached such a point that a commission (The Whelan Commission) was set 
up to investigate the situation. 
Miner commitment to UNIP was a major factor in Katilungu' s dismissa'I from 
the union presidency in 1960. Katilungu' s growing involvement in ANC during 
1959 displeased the miners. The hostility increased when Katilungu accepted 
the Federal government's invitation to serve on the Monckton Commission.102 
The miners accused Katilungu of neglecting the union for politics. This has 
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been cited as.proof of the miners·industrial parochialism and lack of interest 
in nationalist politics. However, the nature of Katilungu's · political 
behavior was an equally important factor. Several informants claimed this was 
the primary reason for Katilungu • s downfall. Mwendapole believed "Katilungu 
had become unpopular because of his views about politics. The views he 
expressed made him unpopular, especially his part in the Monckton Commission. 
He took part in the Monckton Commission totally against the opinion of the 
people of the country. "103 Also, after Katilungu • s dismissal, most union 
leaders with ANC sympathies were purged from the union. The next union 
president, John Chisata, was a well known UNIP supporter. He brought the 
union back into the TUC, and in 1962 even agreed, although reluctantly, to an 
unsatisfactory settlement with the mines in order to facilitate UNIP's chances 
in the upcoming election.104 
Despite this commitment to the nationalist cause, we still have to explain 
the persistent strains between the African Mineworkers' Union and UNIP. 
Chisata clearly disliked calling off the 1962 strike for political reasons, 
and he warned Kaunda that UNIP would not be tolerated meddling in the union's 
internal affairs. Despite his cooperation with the pro UNIP faction of the 
TUC, Chisata continued to stress the independence of the African Mineworkers' 
Union from political direction, either directly from the party, or through the 
Trade Union Congress (UTUC) .105 This refusal to cooperate with UNIP angered 
party officials, who accused union leaders of being "opportunists with no 
national interests at heart. "106 Accusations of this kind only aggravated 
the situation. 
In 1963 relations between UNIP and the union deteriorated further when 
UNIP openly supported a staff association plan to establish a single new union 
for the black miners, the United Mineworkers' Union(UMU). This was sparked by 
the realization that the staff miners could no longer count on protection as 
the "middle class buffer group" of the Federal government. A number of the 
staff association leaders had long cherished the hope of establishing a single 
union. These men convinced the membership to establish the UMU in close 
alliance with UNIP and the United Trade Union Congress. UNIP leaders decided 
to support the new union in the hope that it would be more amenable to party 
direction than the present union. As a result, UNIP allowed the United 
Mineworkers' Union to use UNIP speaking platforms throughout the Copperbelt. 
The new union leaders adopted the party's method of door to door canvassing as 
well. At rallies the leaders called for worker unity, claiming that "we are 
not like the African Mineworkers• Union. We want those underground to join 
with the educated levels so that we can fight together. It is practically 
impossible today to challenge the companies and win alone. "107 Some miners 
joined the fold, attracted by the possiblility of UNIP' s support against 
management after independence.108 
The African Mineworkers' Union broke with the UTUC once again, and 
launched a vitriolic campaign against the United Mineworkers' Union. The 
African Mineworkers' Union fought against the new union not because it opposed 
a single union, which it did not, but because it opposed a union which could 
be controlled by politicians. The AMWU leaders held meetings all over the 
Copperbelt urging their members to · boycott the UMU. "Only fools," they 
claimed, "could now support leaders who had proved so treacherous in the 
past." To prove their dedication to the entire work force, the AMWU agreed to 
a new manning structure and local wage scale in return for a general wage 
increase.109 The companies helped the AMWU also, for despite growing 
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cooperation with UNIP, management did not want a union which would be directly 
controlled by the party. As a result, they agreed to make membership 
transfers from the African Mineworkers' Union to the United Mineworkers' Union 
a complicated and very public procedure. Each dissident had to wait in highly 
visible queues, and publicly declare his desire for cancellation. The 
companies also refused to recognize the UMU as a legitimate employee 
organization. Gradually these efforts paid off, and in June of 1964, the UMU 
disbanded, and a new Mines Local Staff Association was formed.110 
Relations between the African union and UNIP continued to deteriorate 
after independence. Both staff and daily paid miners resented the local wage 
structure which the mines had pushed through during the 1964 crisis over the 
UMU. This structure tied wages of local employees (Zambians) to the local 
economy, rather than the European wage scale, thus destroying the unitary wage 
scale so painfully worked out in 1961. It limited the wage ceiling for black 
miners, and even lowered the wages of some higher grade miners. In 1966 miner 
dissatisfaction finally exploided into a strike. Staff and daily paid miners 
joined forces, demanding a return to the unitary wage scale. Undaunted by 
nationalist rhetoric, the strikers accused the Zambian government of colluding 
with management in order to oppress the workers.111 Once again the miners 
were able to transcend racial divisions, and to identify themselves and their 
opposition in class terms 
How can we explain this discord? We have established the commitment of 
the black miners to the nationalist cause despite corporate restrictions on 
political behavior. Consequently we cannot blame the hostility between union 
and UNIP leaders on the absence of populist political consciousness among the 
miners. This study argues that the answer lies in the nature of the political 
consciousness of the miners. Participation in industrial labor created a 
sense of identity among the copper miners, an awareness of the alliance 
between the state and management, and a recognition of the need to engage in 
political activity in order to protect worker interests. 
The union leaders and the mineworkers expected political action to create 
conditions that would secure their class interests. The miners believed they 
played a critical role in the economy, and that they should be rewarded for 
that fact. As Mwalwanda recalled, "The miners looked forward to when this 
would be their own government. The government are the people, especially 
working people are the government, because when you don't have working men you 
cannot have a government.112 When UNIP leaders tried to use the union for 
national goals, they were sharply rebuffed. From the point of view of the 
nationalists, union leaders were simply being selfish and uncooperative. UNIP 
leaders accused the miners of being "a committed bunch who, if left alone 
would cripple the economy of the country to nothingness. "113 The 
contradiction between the class based political goals of the union and the 
national concerns of UNIP deepened after 1962, when the newly elected 
nationalist ministers faced the problem of establishing a black government• 
The demands of the African miners conflicted with the new government's need 
for copper revenues and its commitment to rural development. To promote these 
policies, government opposed wage increases, and the UNIP dominated TUC 
pressured the miners not to strike. This aggravated the miners, who 
increasingly felt they had lost out since independence and that UNIP had 
decided to abandon them in favor of the companies.114 The political 
alliance which had originally offered a better life for African workers along 
with that of all Africans now appeared little better than the colonial 
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regime. It was this commitment to political action for the benefit of workers 
that caused the rift between UNIP and the union, and it is the possibility of 
a resurgence of this behavior which perpetuates the tension between the union 
and the party to this day. 
Conclusion 
We have seen that during the 1950s and early 1960s, most black miners on 
the Copperbelt understood the class structure of the copper industry; they 
recognized their common interests and the need to protect those interests 
through organized collective action against management. Many of these miners, 
particularly the more stabilized workers, also recognized and acted upon, the 
fundamental identity of interests among the black and white workers in the 
copper industry. The African miners also condemned those blacks who allied 
themselves with management. Thus, throughout this period the black miners 
increasingly recognized and acted upon economic rather than racially defined 
categories within the industrial sphere. 
We have suggested, here and elsewhere,115 that the nature of living and 
working on the copper mines, the early stabilization of a section of the work 
force, and the struggle to improve working conditions, facilitated the 
development of worker consciousness among the black miners. The central 
concern of this paper has been the degree to .which these same factors, and 
others, also clarified the emerging class structure of Northern Rhodesia, and 
as a result, the need for workers to engage in political activity in pursuit 
of their class goals. 
The evidence presented in this paper indicates that the struggles to 
protect the African union during the mid-1950s further exposed the alliance 
between management and the state, and consequently the need for workers to 
organize on a societal level against the state. Miner solidarity and 
commitment to the union grew steadily throughout this period, as did 
willingness to carry the struggle against management into the political 
arena. Between . 1954 and 1957, Congress and the union joined forces in 
opposition to the staff association and the Federation. Many miners joined 
the party, and a number of leading trade unionists also held high posts in 
Congress. This commitment to the nationalist cause continued after the state 
of emergency in 1957, although involvement in political action lessened due to 
corporate pressures. The withdrawal of the union from politics at this time 
reflected the vulnerability of the union to corporate pressures after the 
state of emergency, and the willingness of management to apply these 
pressures, rather than a change in commitment to political action. 
However, we still have to explain the intermittent lack of cooperation, 
and the eventual outright hostility between UNIP and the union. As we have 
seen, most scholars blame this lack of cooperation on the limited 
consciousness of the black mineworkers. In contrast, this paper has argued 
that the union and UNIP came into conflict because of the high degree of class 
consciousness among the black miners and their commitment to using political 
action in pursuit of class goals. In their struggles against management 
before 1957, the union leaders had increasingly recognized the need to engage 
in political action against the state in order to further worker interests. 
Most miners saw no conflict between union and nationalist goals at this time. 
They expected any nationalist government to favor black workers, particularly 
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with the number of trade union leaders highly placed in ANC. When the union 
pulled out of politics in 1957, expectations that an independent black 
government would protect black worker interests did not cease. Within the 
constraints set by management, most miners continued to support the 
nationalist cause. The rift between UNIP and the union only widened as it 
became obvious that the nationalist leaders planned to sacrifice worker 
interests for larger national goals. One could argue that this behavior 
proves the narrow trade union consciousness of the mineworkers, and their lack 
of commitment to the Zambian nation. This arguement, however, ignores the 
history of political involvemnt among the miners •• Union leaders who spoke to 
the author uniformly recognized that the union's decision to abandon politics 
in 1957 cost them the opportunity to shape the government along lines 
acceptable to themselves. As one informant ruefully recalled, "if these 
clauses were not put into operation, and if this force was not put on the 
union side, surely the union would have the government today. "116 Another 
informant admitted that "if we had worked better with the politicians possibly 
we would be the government ourselves •••• We stuck with the union and we lost 
completely. If we hadn't we would be making the laws in other 
countries the leaders are ex-union meU:'117 This is not to say that the 
union leaders were ready to organize a worker party to challenge UNIP. There 
simply weren't enough workers in Zambia for a viable labor party at that 
time. The important point is that union leaders believed the national 
government could have been shaped along lines more acceptable to workers if 
they had remained active in politics. The union leaders had plenty of 
experience organizing people in both trade union and political action. They 
understood the potential of mass organization, and many of them could see 
themselves as politic al leaders .118 Thus, when the miners, particularly the 
union leaders, sensed a growing alliance between the black government and the 
companies, they refused to cooperate with UNIP. Indeed, in 1966 the union 
called a strike in defiance of government orders, and openly accused the 
government and the companies of collusion. The new government ruthlessly 
crushed the strike, and stepped up its campaign to control the union 
leadership afterwards. This paper contends that the severity of this response 
was not only due to governmental determination to maintain high copper 
profits, but also signalled an awareness by government officials that the 
_mineworkers had the organizational potential and political class consciousness 
necessary to create a serious resistance movement against the government, 
perhaps even an opposition party. It was this reality that created the 
tension between UNIP and the union, and indeed, this dilemma remains a source 
of tension in Zambia today. 
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